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Executive Summary 
 
 This report was commissioned by the Trades Union Congress (TUC) to gather and 
analyse evidence, and then propose policy recommendations, in support of the case for a 
new Regional Industrial Strategy for Tees Valley. The report suggests that a Tees Valley 
Industrial Strategy should be centred on creating and sustaining more and better-quality 
local jobs stimulated by the distinct locational assets of Tees Valley and to realise its 
potential as a major international and national industrial hub for a just transition to the 
low carbon economy. The report also suggests that a Tees Valley Industrial Strategy 
should seek to build an economy that works for all people, especially those living in 
communities facing the acute consequences and implications of de-industrialisation, 
global financial crisis, recession and austerity.  
 
 The Government has proposed a new Industrial Strategy based on a framework that 
identifies a more active role for the state in developing long-term, sustainable and 
inclusive growth in the UK’s nations, regions and localities. International evidence 
suggests that all governments should embrace more thoughtful, longer-term, evidenced-
based strategic thinking about how public bodies, at all geographical levels, could work 
towards achieving desired outcomes, including improved productivity, higher levels of 
economic growth, and reduced social and spatial disparities.  
 
 Building a strong geographical or place-based dimension into the new UK Industrial 
Strategy is essential in order to spread prosperity more evenly across the country. A more 
spatially-sensitive approach to industrial policy and strategy requires decentralised forms 
of industrial strategy, such as a Tees Valley Industrial Strategy. 
 
 An analysis of the Tees Valley economy reveals that Tees Valley’s labour market shows 
many of the continued impacts of de-industrialisation, including high joblessness in a 
low-skill and ageing workforce. Tees Valley’s high CO2 emissions per capita (at over three 
times the national average) presents economic and environmental challenges, but also 
presents a real opportunity for Tees Valley to play a leading role in supporting the UK’s 
just transition towards a low carbon economy. 
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 The report sets out an analytical framework to identify the strategic dimensions, tools 
and actors that are expected to provide the foundations of a decentralised industrial 
strategy for Tees Valley. We argue that the overriding aim of creating more and better 
jobs in Tees Valley should see the Industrial Strategy focus on improving industrial 
competitiveness and building and maintaining inclusive growth. A series of tools (e.g. 
Carbon Capture and Storage, skills, inward investment, infrastructure, funding, etc.) are 
proposed, and there is a pivotal role for actors, such as local authorities, the Tees Valley 
Mayor, Combined Authority and trade unions. This is not to downplay or diminish the 
role and value of other tools and actors, but instead it recognises that the TUC and 
unions (nationally and regionally) will need to be smart in how they allocate their 
resources and capacity to influence the Tees Valley Industrial Strategy, especially as trade 
unions have, to date, been at the margins of the new and emergent devolved governance 
arrangements in Tees Valley.  
 
 We propose 22 recommendations, underpinned by the findings, evidence and the 
analytical framework set out in this report, on how the over-arching aims and objectives 
of the Tees Valley Industrial Strategy could be realised. The recommendations, in part, 
support some of the policy priorities being pursued by the Tees Valley Mayor and 
Combined Authority, and are directed towards Government, Tees Valley’s devolved 
governance institutions, local authorities and the TUC itself (nationally and regionally). 
Included in the recommendations are proposals for: 
 
- The Government to give its formal support for the business case prepared by 
Teesside Collective setting out the rationale for Tees Valley to play a leading role in 
UK CCS technology and industry. 
- The Government to support the H21 project to feed hydrogen into the national gas 
grid, as part of a strategy to develop the hydrogen economy.   
- The Government to encourage more investment in ‘waste from energy’ jobs and 
industry. 
- The Metro Mayor and Combined Authority to explore the opportunity to develop a 
Tees Valley Wealth Fund to manage physical assets and generate new revenues and 
capital to reinvest in the Tees Valley economy. 
- The Government to fully devolve the Adult Education Budget to Tees Valley from 
the start of academic year 2018. 
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- The Government and Metro Mayor Combined Authority to develop an integrated 
and locally-led careers support mechanism in Tees Valley covering all age groups.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 This is the final report of a project undertaken by the Centre for Urban and Regional 
Development Studies (CURDS), Newcastle University, on behalf of the TUC, which has 
examined the case for developing a new ‘Regional Industrial Strategy for Tees Valley’. The study 
is one of three pieces of research commissioned by the TUC; the other two projects are focused 
on the Liverpool City Region and East Anglia. In May 2017, Tees Valley was one of six city-
regions in England to elect new ‘Metro Mayors’ to lead Combined Authorities, and each place 
has negotiated a series of devolved powers and resources from Government.  
 
1.2 This study has been conducted against the background of the Government publishing a 
framework for a new UK Industrial Strategy, which advocates more specific and targeted public 
and private sector interventions to support industrial and economic development at national, 
regional and local levels. An Industrial Strategy Green Paper was published in January1 and a 
White Paper is expected to be published around the time of the Budget later this year. One of 
the fundamental questions facing the Industrial Strategy is the extent to which a national strategy 
can be ‘place-based’ and is able to reflect diverse regional and local economies, and the new 
spatial realities of devolved governance arrangements in England. Pillar ten of the Industrial 
Strategy Green Paper outlines some of the institutional arrangements that the Government 
believes are needed to bring sectors and places together under the umbrella of the UK Industrial 
Strategy. Here, the Green Paper is perhaps at its most under-developed, but it presents the TUC 
with an opportunity to make an evidenced-based case to Government and the new Metro 
Mayors and Combined Authorities that trade unions have a key role to play in developing and 
implementing national and regional industrial strategies.  
 
1.3 The purpose of the study has been to gather and analyse evidence, and then propose 
policy recommendations, in support of the TUC’s case for a new Regional Industrial Strategy for 
Tees Valley. The Tees Valley Industrial Strategy should be centred on creating and sustaining 
more and better-quality jobs, drawing upon the distinct locational assets of Tees Valley in order 
to cement Tees Valley’s position as a major international and national industrial hub for the low 
                                                            
1 BEIS (2017) Building our Industrial Strategy, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy: London.  
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carbon economy. The brief for the project illustrated how the TUC has called on the new UK 
Industrial Strategy to be driven by four specific goals: addressing regional inequalities; supporting 
workforce empowerment; identifying a roadmap for a just transition towards sustainable 
industry; and encouraging new approaches to public procurement, tax policy and public 
investment in infrastructure and skills. The brief also emphasised the importance the TUC 
attaches to the Industrial Strategy tackling poverty, and building an economy that works for all 
people, especially those living in communities that facing the acute consequences and 
implications of de-industrialisation, global financial crisis, recession and austerity.  
 
1.4 Previous studies have identified economic and industrial strategies for Tees Valley, and 
associated institutional arrangements.2 The clear message from those who participated in our 
study was the importance of a building and implementing a new integrated place-based vision 
and strategy for Tees Valley that could address the major opportunities and challenges facing the 
Tees Valley economy. Emphasis was placed upon a genuine partnership, including trade unions, 
to work together to deliver the vision of a new Tees Valley Industrial Strategy.  
 
1.5 The study commenced in April and the final report was completed in August. During the 
project, a General Election was held on 8 June and the first Tees Valley Metro Mayor election 
took place in May. The practical implications were that some of the initial timescales envisaged 
for conducting the project fieldwork had to be revised in order to accommodate these two 
events.  
 
1.6 A mix of quantitative and qualitative research methods were employed in the study, 
which were agreed at the outset with the TUC. The methods included: 
 
 Analysis of Office for National Statistics, Department for International Trade/UK Trade 
and Investment and Department for Work Pensions data to produce a social, economic 
and environmental baseline of Tees Valley.  
 23 semi-structured interviews with public, private and trade union actors.  
 Analysis of secondary research, policy and ‘grey literature’ reports and data. 
 ‘Road-testing’ emergent key issues and proposed recommendations from the study at a 
roundtable held at the Riverside Stadium, Middlesbrough, on 11 July.  
                                                            
2 See, for example, www.cityevolutions.org.uk which is conducted research on the evolution and adaptation of UK 
city economies over time including a case study of Middlesbrough and Stockton-on-Tees.  
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 Final report and dissemination. 
 
2. Putting Industrial Strategy in Context 
 
UK Industrial Strategy 
 
2.1 Since the 1980s, the UK has eschewed formal industrial policy and strategy. While there 
have been a succession of national industrial policies,3 there has been limited integration of 
industrial policy and strategy across Government.4 The new Industrial Strategy sets out a 
framework for a more active role for Government in developing long-term, sustainable and 
inclusive growth in the UK’s nations, regions and localities.5 In adopting a more explicit 
interventionist approach, the Government is embracing a model that other countries have been 
formulating and implementing for decades.6 In recent months, independent research 
commissions have sought to provide some intellectual clarity to the UK Industrial Strategy.7 
 
2.2 International evidence in relation to industrial strategy suggests that all governments 
should embrace more thoughtful, longer-term, evidenced-based and strategic thinking about how 
public bodies, at all geographical levels, could work towards desired outcomes including 
improved productivity, higher levels of economic growth, and reduced social and spatial 
disparities.8 Furthermore, industrial policy is by its nature necessarily geographical.9 International 
evidence demonstrates that the most effective forms of government intervention, in steering 
modern mixed economies towards desired outcomes, are characterised by being long-term and 
strategic, combining evolution and innovation, and attempts to co-ordinate and integrate 
                                                            
3 Michael Heseltine, Peter Mandelson and Vince Cable could lay claim to advocating some form of industrial 
strategy at various stages over the past 25 years.  
4 Coyle, D. (2017) ‘Theresa May’s industrial strategy: what took them so long?’ The Guardian, 24 January: London: 
https://www.theguardian.com/small-business-network/2017/jan/24/theresa-may-industrial-strategy-long-overdue-
decline  
5 BEIS (2017) Building our Industrial Strategy Green Paper, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy: London.  
6 See, for example, Chang, H-J., Andreoni, A. and Leong Kuan, M. (2013) ‘International industrial policy 
experiences and the lessons for the UK’, Future of Manufacturing Project: Evidence Paper 4, Foresight, 
Government Office for Science: London.  
7 See, for example, the Industrial Strategy Commission, sponsored by the University of Manchester and the 
University of Sheffield: www.industrialstrategycommission.org.uk and the ippr Commission on Economic Justice: 
www.ippr.org/cej  
8 See, for example, Aiginger, K. (2014) Industrial Policy for a Sustainable Growth Plan, Policy Paper 13, 
https://www.oecd.org/eco/Industrial-Policy-for-a-sustainable-growth-path.pdf  
9 Pike, A. (2017) Industrial Strategy: a contribution to a BEIS academic roundtable, CURDS, Newcastle University: 
Newcastle upon Tyne.  
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national economic ambitions in geographically sensitive ways.10 Building a strong geographical or 
place-based dimension into the new UK Industrial Strategy will be needed to help spread 
prosperity more evenly across the country.  
 
2.3 A critical challenge for the UK Industrial Strategy will be to strike an appropriate balance 
between a focus on economic activities and/or places with the strongest shorter-term economic 
potential and those areas with relatively weaker prospects and/or facing structural problems. 
Local and regional economies, such as that of Tees Valley, should identify, harness and re-utilise 
industrial assets in order to develop new paths of growth, while place-based industrial strategy 
has to address the underlying causes and symptoms of inequality and weak productivity. 
International evidence also demonstrates that industrial strategies should include a focus upon 
generating ‘more and better jobs’ in more inclusive and sustainable models.11  
 
TUC and Industrial Strategy 
 
2.4 In 2005, the TUC published a paper calling for a new national Industrial Strategy,12 and it 
has examined evidence of international good practice in industrial policy in France, Germany, 
China and South Korea,13 with recent TUC reports calling on the Government to implement an 
“overarching strategy for wealth creation”.14 The TUC has identified six areas that the new UK 
Industrial Strategy should focus upon: investing in infrastructure; developing and utilising skills; 
building a worker voice to building more productive businesses; seeking maximum access to the 
European Single Market after the UK leaves the European Union and expanding trading 
relationships with other markets; securing the best return on corporate tax reliefs; and using 
direct government and public sector spending to support strategic industries.  
 
2.5 During a recent interview with the ‘The Independent’, TUC General Secretary, Frances 
O’Grady, lamented the UK’s short-term, narrow approach to public and private investment, 
                                                            
10 Warwick, K. (2013) ‘Beyond Industrial Policy: Emerging Issues and New Trends’, OECD Science, Technology 
and Industry Policy Papers, No. 2, OECD Publishing: Paris. Rodrik, D. (2008) ‘Normalizing Industrial Policy’, 
Working Paper No.3, Commission on Growth and Development, The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/World Bank: Washington D.C. Mazzucato, M. (2013) The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public 
vs. Private Sector Myths, Anthem Press: London. 
11 See, for example, OECD (2015) Making Inclusive Growth Happen, OECD: Paris.  
12 TUC (2005) An Industrial Strategy for the United Kingdom: A TUC Discussion Paper, Trades Union Congress: 
London.  
13 Page, T. (2017) ‘Green Paper on Industrial Strategy: A good start and more to do’, Touchstone blog, Trades 
Union Congress: London, 23 January.  
14 TUC (2014) The Way of the Dragon: What can the UK learn from the rise of China and East Asia?, Trades 
Union Congress: London: 60.  
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suggesting that “shareholder supremacy is at the very core of Britain. When half of all shares are 
owned by overseas investors, and by investors who only hold them for six months, then you 
have a problem”.15 The remedy, she said, was more investment, and better workforce training.  
 
2.6 The TUC regards workforce engagement as a key pillar of UK and Regional Industrial 
Strategy.16 According to the TUC, unions, government and business need to adopt a new 
framework for working in partnership towards shared goals, such as improving the quality of 
jobs and raising overall living standards. Corporate governance reforms – such as new rules that 
require companies to give workers’ seats on company boards – are also identified as measures to 
improve the quality and long-term focus of decision making in Britain’s businesses.17 
 
2.7 To date, unions have been largely absent from statutory corporate governance 
arrangements in the UK, with the exception of European Works Councils. According to the 
TUC, “industrial success is a collaborative process: the best companies enjoy the benefits of 
excellent management, engaged shareholders (or a visionary owner) and a talented, well-trained, 
properly paid workforce”.18 The TUC’s response to the Industrial Strategy Green Paper argued 
that, although the Government had identified ten pillars to encapsulate the approach to 
industrial strategy, there should be an additional pillar, entitled ‘workforce participation for 
successful industries’. In addition, the TUC has argued that what is good at the micro (i.e. firm) 
level should also be acceptable at the level of the wider economy (i.e. sectors). In particular, 
unions should be represented on any new sectoral bodies, with the suggestion that union 
involvement provides for better decision-making and, ultimately, increased productivity. 
Furthermore, an argument is made for workers and unions to be involved at an institutional 
level, within the devolved economic development landscape, particularly in England.  
 
Principles of (Decentralised) Industrial Strategy 
 
                                                            
15 Pagano, M. (2017) ‘A view from the top: Frances O’Grady: General Secretary of the British Trades Union 
Congress’, The Independent, 26 July.  
16 TUC (2017) TUC response to the UK Industrial Strategy Green Paper, Trades Union Congress: London.  
17 On 29 August 2017, the Government published proposals for reforming corporate governance in British firms. 
However, the TUC has been critical at the absence in the proposals of measures to compel firms to put workers on 
company boards.  
18 Page, T. (2017) ‘Industrial Strategy: Which sectors should we focus upon?’ Touchstone blog, Trades Union 
Congress: London, 11 May.  
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2.8 In advocating a more spatially-sensitive approach to industrial policy and strategy, we 
have identified three fundamental principles that should shape the UK Industrial Strategy and its 
associated variants at regional and local levels:  
 
 The first principle is that long-term policy and investment frameworks are needed to 
nurture and implement more active and interventionist roles for governments at national, 
local/city-regional levels – and in particular to address spatial inequalities. 
 The second principle is a specific focus on generating ‘more and better jobs’ in more 
inclusive and sustainable development models. 
 Third, is that effective (and integrated) forms of government intervention should be 
strategic, combining evolution and innovation, and are geographically-sensitive (i.e. are 
placed-based). 
 
2.9 Moving towards a genuine decentralised industrial strategy, which is the focus of this 
particular study, poses a series of fundamental questions to policy-makers and other actors, 
including trade unions. These include: 
 
 How to make industrial strategy place-based? 
 What is the role of devolved governance institutions in designing and delivering an 
industrial strategy? 
 How can an industrial strategy achieve a balance between activities and/or places with 
the strongest potential and those places facing challenging circumstances? 
 
2.10 Drawing upon these principles and questions, we developed an analytical framework 
(Table 1) in which to situate and examine the elements required for developing a new Industrial 
Strategy for Tees Valley. Given the remit of the study and also mindful of project resources and 
timescales, our focus centred on the strategies, tools and (certain) actors engaged in decentralised 
industrial strategy.  
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Table 1: Elements of a decentralised industrial strategy19 
Elements Description 
Objectives Tapping under-utilised potential for industrial competitiveness 
Focus More and better jobs 
Strategies Integrated development projects 
Tools Soft and hard infrastructures 
Actors Multi-level governance 
Unit of analysis Functional regions  
Approach Promoting economic development by bringing actors together and 
targeting local assets 
Source: Adapted by O’Brien, P., Dawley, S., MacKinnon, D. and Tomaney, J. (2017) Industrial Strategy Green Paper 
Consultation: A submission by the Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies, Newcastle University from 
Aiginger, K. (2014) ‘Industrial Policy for a Sustainable Growth Plan’, Policy Paper 13, 
https://www.oecd.org/eco/Industrial-Policy-for-a-sustainable-growth-path.pdf 
 
3. An Assessment of the Tees Valley Economy 
 
3.1 At the outset of the project, we were advised by the TUC that the purpose of the study 
was not to review the existing Tees Valley Strategic Economic Plan (SEP), which has recently 
been revised and rebadged as the ‘Tees Valley Industrial Strategy’.20 Instead, the intention was to 
produce an evidence base to support the case for a particular and distinct contribution by the 
TUC and its affiliate unions to the economic governance, strategy and interventions required to 
build and sustain a more productive, inclusive and resilient economy in Tees Valley. During the 
research, we were fortunate to benefit from a range of contributions from Tees Valley Combined 
Authority officials, who gave significant time and shared substantial amounts of intelligence, data 
and information with us. We think it is important to recommend that other city-regions or 
aspirant Mayoral Combined Authorities look to the example of Tees Valley and build and 
maintain executive capacity and resources (especially analytical capability), similar to that in the 
Tees Valley Combined Authority, in order to support the development and implementation of 
decentralised industrial strategies, and to provide distinct foresight and intelligence. We also 
think that city-regions in England should work in partnership and share information with each 
other in order to learn from good practice, and to consider, as the TUC has itself suggested, 
                                                            
19 This table summarises an emerging new paradigm on place-based industrial policy.  
20 TVCA (2016) Tees Valley Strategic Economic Plan: the Industrial Strategy for Tees Valley (2016-2026), Tees 
Valley Combined Authority: Stockton-on-Tees.  
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international and other UK case studies on how decentralised industrial strategy is designed and 
implemented.  
 
 
3.2 We were asked by the TUC to undertake data analysis of the Tees Valley economy, and 
in particular the city-region’s labour market, in order to produce a baseline from which we could 
assess the strengths and weaknesses and opportunities and challenges facing Tees Valley in the 
short, medium and long-terms. Tees Valley is a city-region located in the north of England, 
comprising five local authority areas (Darlington, Hartlepool, Middlesbrough, Redcar and 
Cleveland and Stockton-on-Tees) with a combined population of 667,500, and a broad range of 
physical and other infrastructure assets (Figure 1). The city-region has a historical industrial base, 
with steel, shipbuilding, oil, gas, chemicals, process and pharmaceuticals forming the bulk of 
traditional industries. In recent years, digital, creative, biologics, health sciences and the low 
carbon economy have grown in importance.21 The Tees Valley Combined Authority was 
established in April 2016, and a new ‘Metro Mayor’ for the Tees Valley Combined Authority 
area, Ben Houchen (Conservative), was elected in May 2017.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
21 TVCA (2015) Tees Valley Economic Assessment, Tees Valley Combined Authority: Stockton-on-Tees.  
Case Study: ‘Taking Wales Forward: A devolved industrial strategy 
‘Taking Wales Forward’ outlines a plan for how the Welsh Government will deliver more and better jobs 
through a stronger, fairer economy, improve and reform public services, and build a united, connected 
and sustainable Wales. The Welsh Government aims to foster the conditions needed to allow businesses 
to thrive and to create and retain high quality jobs in Wales. The intention is to promote manufacturing as 
a key sector for growth in the Welsh economy, whilst reducing burdens on business and stimulating 
innovation and growth, working with universities and colleges. There will be investment in infrastructure 
to connect people with jobs, housing and leisure. In addition, reflecting the importance of connecting 
more people to better quality jobs, the Welsh Government will invest in skills and training, workforce 
health and childcare. To build a fairer society, the Welsh Government will repeal sections of UK Trades 
Union legislation in devolved areas, take action on the living wage, limit the use of zero hours contracts 
and tackle bad employment practices. 
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Figure 1: Tees Valley Combined Authority area 
 
Source: TVCA (2016) Tees Valley Strategic Economic Plan: The Industrial Strategy for Tees Valley 2016-2026, Tees 
Valley Combined Authority: Stockton-on-Tees. 
 
3.3 The geography of the labour market analysis used Tees Valley as the primary focus, with 
values expressed relative to a national comparator (more often than not this is the UK, but 
occasionally it has to be Great Britain, and in the case of deprivation it is England). Where 
readily-available, data was also collected for the Liverpool City Region to use as comparator 
‘Combined Authority’ area (see annex 1 for the full breakdown of data analysis), and also for the 
North East region as a context. Some data that was readily-available was also analysed for the 
five local authorities that together constitute Tees Valley. Travel-to-Work Areas (TTWAs) could 
have been used at a sub-Tees Valley scale, but this would have involved significant additional 
data mining and analysis. One idea, when the project was first conceived, was to undertake some 
form of analysis of commuting data, but the relevant, available information only enabled an 
examination of the labour market areas of specific employed population sub-groups. For 
example, the equivalent of the TTWA for those people with high level qualifications includes not 
only all of Tees Valley’s three TTWAs, but also parts of North Yorkshire to the south of 
Darlington along with large parts of County Durham (e.g. Barnard Castle – Bishop Auckland – 
Newton Aycliffe – Spennymoor – Peterlee). 
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3.4 In examining the distinct nature of the Tees Valley economy, and its future opportunities 
and challenges, it was important to review the industrial structure of Tees Valley, and the area’s 
carbon emissions. Not surprisingly, given the size and scale of industry and energy-intensive 
sectors in Tees Valley, CO2 emissions per capita in Tees Valley are very high compared to the 
national (England) average and other Mayoral Combined Authority areas (Figure 2), suggesting 
that Tees Valley produces a significant percentage of CO2 emissions on behalf of the country as 
a whole. If Tees Valley were able to capture and store industrial CO2 then this would provide a 
major contribution to reducing total national CO2 emissions, and would demonstrate that Tees 
Valley was the ideal location to help increase UK industrial competitiveness and improve 
environmental conditions by developing carbon capture technology and infrastructure, and in so 
doing create a significant number of high-quality jobs for the local economy.  
 
Figure 2: Total CO2 emissions per capita of Mayoral Combined Authority areas (tons) 
 
Source: Adapted from Scott, F. and Poggi, C. (2017) Greening the city regions: opportunities for new metro mayors, 
Green Alliance: London based on data from DECC (2016) UK local authority and regional carbon dioxide 
emissions national statistics 2005-2014, Department for Energy and Climate Change: London. 
 
3.5 One strand of analysis covered as background context is ‘need’ in relation to the labour 
market. As anticipated, Tees Valley has levels above the national average for unemployment 
(both for the whole working age group and the younger age group), work-related benefit receipts 
and neighbourhood deprivation generally (Figure 3). Other related indicators show patterns 
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reflecting some of the primary drivers of poverty (especially with the current austerity 
programme of benefit cuts). Of those local residents who do have jobs and/or in employment, 
the proportion of people who work part-time is above the national average. Negative ‘multiplier’ 
effects of poverty at the Tees Valley scale are exacerbated by below average wage rates of those 
who are employed, leading to below average disposable household incomes per head. It has not 
been necessary to analyse change-over-time in relation to these indicators of ‘precarity’ because 
their relatively high levels will not have changed noticeably for over a decade or more.  
 
Figure 3: Labour market participation 2016: Tees Valley relative to national index = 100 
 
Source: Authors’ research based on ONS data.  
 
3.6 Looking towards the future economy, it has been suggested that Tees Valley, like many 
other places, faces an above average risk of job loss from increased automation, with robotics 
increasing in certain sectors. However, it has not been possible to obtain accurate statistics to 
either verify or disprove this argument. 
 
3.7 Turning our attention towards production, the proportion of jobs in those occupational 
sectors of the Tees Valley economy that are likely to pay higher rates of pay is below the national 
average. This partly reflects the sectoral breakdown of the local economy and low levels of 
labour demand. The proportion of jobs in sectors, such as mining and manufacturing, is above 
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average, and in the occupational structure of the employed workforce, a broad group of jobs that 
are often low paid (e.g. care and sales services, machine operatives and elementary work), it is 
notably more heavily represented in Tees Valley than in the country overall. Average productivity 
levels reflects these basic patterns in being significantly below the national average. Two other 
generalised indicators of the ‘traditional’ nature of the local economy are below average levels of 
self-employment and a lower number of firms per thousand working age residents.  
 
3.8 In relation to some of the more specific concerns within the research project, a series of 
other labour market indicators have been reviewed and are situated within the SWOT analyses 
framework produced, in part, by the Tees Valley Combined Authority (see Table 2). The most 
obvious finding is that no factors identified as strengths are labour market factors, and each 
reference to the local labour market falls within the weakness category. One of these includes 
future speculation, which is not amenable to measurement at this stage, of the effects of Brexit, 
which we suggest may impact strongly on the local economy due to the increased difficulty of 
attracting skilled migrants to Tees Valley, because if there is the expected reduced inflow of 
migrants into the UK, it is plausible that Tees Valley will struggle to compete with other places 
that are seen as more attractive. Having said that, Tees Valley has attracted relatively few 
international in-migrants to date so is less vulnerable than other areas if Brexit leads to many EU 
citizens leaving the UK. One related fact, which is measurable, is the ‘brain drain’ created by the 
net outflow of highly qualified people from Tees Valley to the rest of the UK, especially those 
aged under 30. On other labour market issues of concern, Tees Valley is only slightly 
disadvantaged relative to the national average, in areas such as trends in apprenticeship numbers, 
and the possibility that an above average proportion of the skilled workforce is approaching 
retirement age. Skill-related statistics reveal an above average proportion of 16 year olds do not 
achieve expected levels of GCSEs, and there is an above average share of the local workforce 
without any formal recognised qualification, including NVQ1. Once again, there is an argument 
that there is little added value for conducting change-over-time analyses of these differentials as 
they are long-established features of the Tees Valley economy.  
 
3.9 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) figures for the period 2015/16 – based on information 
provided to us by the Department for International Trade/UK Trade and Investment – have 
been made analysed.22 The data shows that Tees Valley’s share of the national total of FDI 
                                                            
22 The 2015/16 data on FDI projects in Tees Valley is seen as an outlier, although it has not been possible to acquire 
further data from DIT/UKTI. In 2015/16, the SSI steel-works closure and a couple of major projects did not come 
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projects, and estimated jobs created, was about half the level which might have been expected 
based on Tees Valley’s share of employed people in the country. Finally, it is worth highlighting 
one economic factor that is only measurable at the broader scale of the region (i.e. North East), 
and that is export performance. The value of exports made up a slightly higher proportion of the 
total from the UK than would be expected, based on the region’s share of employed people in 
the country, although this degree of ‘over-performing’ has narrowed over the period 2011-16. 
Importantly, in relation to Brexit, the dependence on the EU as market for these exports was 
much higher for the North East than Great Britain overall, and was especially true for 
manufacturing exports.  
 
3.10 In summary, the key messages from our assessment of the Tees Valley economy are that: 
 
• Tees Valley’s labour market shows many of the continued impacts of de-industrialisation, 
including high joblessness in a low-skill and ageing workforce. 
• Tees Valley’s high CO2 emissions presents a threat but also an opportunity for the local 
area to play a leading role in the UK’s just transition towards a low carbon economy. 
• Claimant rates for young people are double the national average (Great Britain); long-
term job deficiency has led to high deprivation levels. 
• Productivity is below average, and while manufacturing remains a vital source of jobs, 
FDI has been low in recent years. 
• Tees Valley’s labour force is poorly-qualified as measured by NVQs, and the net flow of 
out-migration is exacerbated as young, skilled people leave the area. 
• In relation to Brexit, below average international in-migration rates imply a low level of 
concern over lost craft skills in Tees Valley, but [based on data for the North East] there 
is an above average dependence on the EU as an export market, especially for 
manufacturing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
to fruition, which may have impacted upon Tees Valley’s FDI performance. The DIT/UKTI data is data that 
LEPs/Combined Authorities share with DIT/UKTI. 
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Table 2: SWOT analysis of Tees Valley ‘Economy’ 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 Major port with strong links to northern 
Europe, with considerable potential for 
expansion 
 Large, nationally important chemicals and 
processing industry 
 Health innovation and expertise in 
specialist areas 
 Emerging digital, creative and business 
service sectors 
 Number of centres of excellence and 
innovation centres in key locations 
 East rail hub at Darlington providing 
north-south connections, including 
Scotland 
 Attractive towns, countryside and coast 
 Ageing workforce 
 Poor school attainment at post-primary 
level 
 Low demand/supply of high level skills 
 Gaps in existing labour market specialisms  
 Poor perceptions of the area 
 Limited small business/enterprise culture 
 Market failure in commercial and 
residential property markets 
 High levels of deprivation, including high 
percentage of young people claiming 
benefits 
 Market failures in residential and 
commercial property markets 
 Variable external links, particularly by rail 
and east to west 
Opportunities Threats 
 Increasing leisure and visitor market, 
including outdoor and cultural tourism 
 Increasing demand for innovation in 
products and services for the health sector 
 Increasing demand through national 
growth in creative, digital and business 
services 
 Economic benefits of a circular economy 
approach to industrial production 
 Economic benefits of transport 
investment – new stations at Darlington 
and Middlesbrough and Tees Crossing 
 International competition in the chemicals 
and processing industries, with lower cost 
base 
 Competition for skilled and experienced 
labour from other city regions in the 
north and south east 
 Long-term commitment to and costs of 
de-carbonising major energy use sectors 
 Automation and robotics reducing jobs in 
key industrial sectors 
 Other towns and cities becoming better 
connected and networked 
 
 
 
3.11 When benchmarking economic and labour market data against the headline strategic 
objectives of the Tees Valley SEP (Table 3), two issues become apparent. First, is the scale of the 
challenge in building a more productive, resilient and inclusive Tees Valley economy. Second, is 
the requirement for a Tees Valley Industrial Strategy to be driven by a long-term vision and 
commitment by all actors to secure more public and private investment.  
 
 
Source: TVCA (2016) Tees Valley Strategic Economic Plan: The Industrial Strategy for Tees Valley 2016-2026, 
Tees Valley Combined Authority: Stockton-on-Tees and Authors’ research. 
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Table 3: Objectives of Tees Valley SEP 
SEP Headline Impacts 
 
Position of Tees Valley (UK = 100) 
Increase business density by 10% Business registrations (2015) –67.2% 
Increase jobs density by 55% Employment rate (2015-2016) –92.8% 
Improve GVA per hour (productivity) by 30% GVA per hour worked –89.8% 
Increase population by 6% Population growth (2011-15) –24.1% 
Reduce CO2 emissions by 25% CO2 emissions by resident +322.2% 
Increase number of people with NVQ Level 4 
by 20% 
NVQ4 (16-64) –80.6% 
Source: TVCA (2016) Tees Valley Strategic Economic Plan: The Industrial Strategy for Tees Valley 2016-2026, Tees 
Valley Combined Authority: Stockton-on-Tees, ONS (2017) Combined Authority Economic Indicators and Scott, 
F. and Poggi, C. (2017) Greening the City Regions: New Opportunities for Metro Mayors, Green Alliance: London. 
 
 
4. Foundations of a Tees Valley Industrial Strategy 
 
4.1 Reflecting baseline economic, social and environmental data analysis, the existing Tees 
Valley SEP, emergent UK Industrial Strategy and the objectives of the TUC study, we drilled 
down from our analytical framework to consider the development of a Tees Valley Industrial 
Strategy, with a specific focus on three key elements: strategy, tools and actors (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Three elements of a decentralised Industrial Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ research. 
 
Strategy 
Tools Actors 
19 
 
4.2 Using the analytical framework as a basis for conducting quantitative and qualitative 
analysis, each element was considered and brought together in an attempt to identify a series of 
potential issues and actions that might help to develop and deliver the overriding aims and 
objectives of the Tees Valley Industrial Strategy. Given the remit of the study, the priority was to 
concentrate on certain actors, with particular attention given to local authorities, Tees Valley 
Mayor and Combined Authority, Government and trade unions.  
 
Strategy  
 There are two dimensions to this element. The first is a strategic focus on creating more 
and better jobs through tapping under-utilised potential for improving industrial 
competitiveness. This includes encouraging sector diversification and greater support for 
low carbon and ‘advanced manufacturing’ industries, which builds on Tees Valley’s 
distinct location, track record of  reinvention and adaptation, and its ability to capitalise 
upon and adapt to new technologies. 
 The second dimension is a long-term vision and programme of  public and private 
investment, which recognises that narrow approaches to economic growth alone will not 
reduce inequality, and that more inclusive, sustainable and resilient development is 
shaped by broader concepts of  economic, social and environmental value. 
 
Tools 
 Integrated, multi-level (including decentralised) economic development policies and 
actions. 
 Public and private interventions and funding and financing investment mechanisms 
(especially in skills, physical development, economic and social infrastructure and 
procurement). 
 Place-based marketing to build and expand FDI and trade relationships for Tees Valley 
to derive benefits from mature and new and emergent markets. 
 Systems-based approaches that recognise the inter-dependencies between and across 
sectors and industries in Tees Valley and can help to strengthen resilience by adapting to 
change and potential external shocks. 
 Public and private research, science and innovation. 
 
Actors 
 Effective and inclusive national, sub-national and local government and governance. 
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 Meaningful devolution alongside a long-term strategic partnership with UK 
Government.  
 Anchor institutions (including local authorities, universities, colleges and hospitals). 
 Business.  
 Trade unions. 
 Voluntary sector and local communities. 
 Environmental sector. 
 
4.3 Adopting these three elements would provide a sound basis for realising an over-arching 
vision and strategy for Tees Valley to improve and utilise untapped industrial competitiveness. In 
moving towards this vision and strategy, there are two inter-dependent strands to the strategic 
dimension that is based around the notion of ‘Industrial Competitiveness’. The first strand is to 
ensure a just transition to a low carbon future by supporting and remediating existing energy-
intensive industries. The second is to create, through advanced manufacturing, new industries 
and technologies in sectors seen as critical for increasing high value employment and improving 
overall productivity.23 
 
Strategy: Improving ‘Industrial Competitiveness’ 
 
4.4 Tees Valley is a major national centre of energy intensive industry. The Tees Valley SEP 
references sectors that reflect the ‘industrial DNA’ of Tees Valley and the city-region’s distinct 
position within the UK political economy. Energy/low carbon, chemicals, processing and 
materials industries were identified by those we interviewed in the study as being pivotal to Tees 
Valley’s long-term economic future.24 The presence locally of integrated facilities in chemicals, 
process and materials is seen as a unique source of competitive advantage.  
 
“Important to look at the historical origins and industrial legacy of Teesside (particularly 
Middlesbrough), when considering the distinct/unique role of Tees Valley in building a more productive 
and low carbon economy. Fabrication facilities that once built ships have tuned their hands to oil/gas and 
now renewables. Huge market for [oil, gas and nuclear] decommissioning ageing assets and kit as well. 
                                                            
23 Green, A., Sissons, P. and Lee, N. (2017) Harnessing Growth Sectors for Poverty Reduction: The Role of Policy, 
a report for the Public Policy Institute for Wales: Cardiff.  
24 Process industries have been identified as the ‘engine room’ of the Tees Valley economy because of its place at the 
nexus of a system of related sectors and industries.   
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Firms and Tees Valley has a tradition of reinvention and looking to capitalise on new markets” 
(Authors’ interview with Teesside University, June 2017). 
 
4.5 Resource efficiency, including converting waste into energy, part a broader shift towards 
a circular economy, has been identified as an industrial strength in which Tees Valley could play 
a leading national and international role. The drive to reduce industrial carbon emissions, and to 
generate more efficient and sustainable industrial processes, including embracing alternative 
feedstocks, has led the Tees Valley Combined Authority to prioritise building and expanding the 
circular economy. The ability to use existing skills, assets and technology in bio-fuels and 
renewable materials is highlighted as offering genuine potential, although more consistent 
national policy statements in relation to energy and carbon reductions is regarded as essential to 
maintaining private sector investment going forward.  
 
4.6 The multi-million pound investment by SABIC in the Wilton ‘cracker’, which was 
supported by UK Government finance, was cited as an example of private industry having 
sufficient confidence to invest in Tees Valley, and building a key infrastructure asset for existing 
and future processes and products, as were the power plant investments made by Sembcorp. At 
the heart of these developments lies an innovation eco-system, which is continually striving to 
create and utilise new technologies. The conversation of existing or redundant infrastructure 
assets, such as the former Graythorpe shipyard in Hartlepool (now Able Seaton Port), where 
Able UK has made capital investments in order to support the decommissioning of the Shell 
Brent Delta platform, is seen as a sector where Tees Valley can gain a distinct competitive 
advantage over other places.  
 
4.7 Other opportunities are emerging in the guise of the Hydrogen H21 project and the 
Sirius £2.3bn potash mine in the North York Moors, which will extract and then transport raw 
fertiliser material (polyhalite) to Tees Valley for processing and export. And potential renewable 
offshore wind investments are also materialising, with Tees Valley looking to secure investments 
similar to those on the Humber. In this regard, investments being made by JDR Cables in 
Hartlepool and Offshore Structures Britain in Stockton-on-Tees are significant for strengthening 
Tees Valley’s position as a major centre for the UK offshore wind industry.  
 
4.8 Carbon capture and storage (CCS) was identified by many research interviewees as a 
major opportunity for Tees Valley (see Case Study below), and many actors we spoke to called 
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on the Government to commit to supporting and investing in an industry that would generate a 
large numbers of new jobs and significant investment in the local economy. Tees Valley is 
fortunate in that it can use its existing physical assets, which, coupled with new infrastructure, 
would place the city-region at the forefront of UK CCS technology and environmental 
sustainability. Amongst the trade union officials we spoke to, there was a strong support for a 
move towards a low carbon economy, as part of a decentralised industrial strategy, with the 
proviso that it was based on a just transition model that decarbonises industry through a genuine 
partnership between business, government, workers and unions. During our research, we were 
signposted towards a European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)-sponsored project, which 
examined industrial regions and climate change policies provides evidence of how the process of 
a just transition can be implemented.25 The project was based on analysis and findings from 
seven case studies of ‘industrial regions’ in Europe – Yorkshire and the Humber (UK), North 
Rhine-Westphalia (Germany), Asturias (Spain), Antwerp Province (Belgium), Norbotten 
Province (Sweden), Stara Zagora (Bulgaria) and Silesia (Poland). The study explored, in 
partnership with unions, the policies and actions required, at sub-national and regional levels, to 
support manufacturing industries and related jobs while reducing carbon emissions. Five key 
messages emerged on how industrial regions could build and implement a low carbon economy 
along the lines of the ‘just transition’ model: 
 
 Policy planning and development should take place at the sub-national/regional level. 
 Regional governance structures should ensure workers’ participation. 
 The EU should help accelerate the deployment of low carbon breakthrough 
technologies. 
 Having a skilled workforce is a major asset for regions seeking a just transition towards a 
low carbon economy.  
 Local political, business, worker and community support for decarbonisation should be 
strengthened by mitigating its social impact and maximising its benefits.26 
 
4.9 We examine the SSI (Redcar) site legacy in a later section of this report. Despite the 
significant job losses that have taken place in the steel industry – employment fell from 32,000 in 
1971 to 3,000 in 201027 – steel-making is still operating and making a profit in Tees Valley. For 
                                                            
25 ETUC (2016) Industrial regions and climate policies: towards a just transition? European Trade Union 
Confederation: Brussels.  
26 Ibid: p7.  
27 E. Evenhuis (2016) ‘The Political Economy of Adaptation and Resilience in Old Industrial Regions: A 
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example, the British Steel Teesside Beam Mill at Lackenby and the Special Profiles site at 
Skinningrove.28 British Steel has also acquired a stake in the Redcar Bulk Terminal, providing the 
company with access to potential new national and international markets.29  
 
Strategy: Inclusive Growth 
 
4.10 The Tees Valley Industrial Strategy will need to address questions of how to create and 
sustain more inclusive forms of growth, while at the same time addressing the local economy’s 
weak productivity. A wide range of evidence is beginning to demonstrate that socially and 
spatially unequal models of economic growth and development act as a drag on productivity 
improvement. International policy attention and evidence has focused upon inclusive growth as 
a means of generating ‘more and better’ jobs in more sustainable growth models.30 Place-based 
industrial strategy has a critical role to play in contributing towards the vision, aims and 
development and delivery of policies designed to integrate the quantitative and qualitative 
dimensions of economic growth and build and sustain more inclusive forms of growth.31 
 
4.11 CURDS’ research has revealed that economic growth alone does not necessarily reduce 
inequality, and that places, such as Tees Valley, require comprehensive, integrated and, where 
appropriate, decentralised economic development, employment and skills and infrastructure 
policies. In particular, the Government has a role in creating financial incentives for local 
authorities to address persistent labour market exclusion through ‘welfare earn back’ models, 
which would see the financial benefits of addressing unemployment shared between localities 
and national policy-makers.32 
 
4.12 Analysis by the Inclusive Growth Analysis Unit (IGAU), University of Manchester 
suggests that Tees Valley lies in the bottom quartile of LEP areas for low prosperity and low 
                                                            
Comparative Study of South Saarland and Teesside’, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Centre for Urban and Regional 
Development Studies, Newcastle University: Newcastle upon Tyne.  
28 TVCA (2017) ‘Tees Valley Mayor praises British Steel during Skinningrove Visit’, Tees Valley Combined 
Authority, Stockton-on-Tees, 18 July: https://teesvalley-ca.gov.uk/media/tees-valley-mayor-praises-british-steel-
skinningrove-visit/  
29 Hughes, M. (2017) ‘British Steel reveal £126 million turnaround and buy 50% stake in Redcar Bulk Terminal’, 
Evening Gazette, 1 June.  
30 See, for example, OECD (2015) Making Inclusive Growth Happen, OECD: Paris. 
31 See, for example, the work of the RSA Inclusive Growth Commission. 
32 Pike, A., MacKinnon, D., Coombes, M., Champion, T., Bradley, D., Cumbers, A., Robson, L. and Wymer, C. 
(2016) Uneven growth: tackling city decline, Joseph Rowntree Foundation: York.  
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inclusion measures (Table 4).33 Tees Valley did, however, make some of the biggest 
improvements in addressing inequality during the period 2010-2015. 
Table 4: Economic Inclusion and Prosperity in LEP areas (2015)34   
Low Prosperity and Low Inclusion 
(LEPs in bottom quartile for prosperity 
and inclusion) 
 
High Prosperity and High Inclusion 
LEPs in highest quartile for prosperity 
and inclusion) 
Black Country Thames Valley Berkshire 
Liverpool City Region Buckinghamshire Thames Valley 
Tees Valley Enterprise M3 
North Eastern Oxfordshire 
Humber Hertfordshire 
Lancashire Gloucestershire 
Sheffield City Region Cheshire and Warrington 
Source: Rafferty, A., Hughes, C. and Lupton, R. (2017) Inclusive Growth (IG) Monitor 2017: Local Enterprise 
Partnerships, Inclusive Growth Analysis Unit, University of Manchester: Manchester. 
 
 
4.13 Place-based industrial strategies should encompass the broader economy, and put 
productivity and quality jobs at the heart of agendas’ to support inclusive growth.35 In Tees 
Valley, one of the key priorities is to increase the breadth and depth of sector diversification. 
Retail, hospitality and leisure sectors are low productivity sectors of the economy – reflecting a 
combination of in-work productivity factors (i.e. need to improve wages, firm management and 
utilise new technology) and also factors of deprivation, such as low skills and exclusion. Large 
parts of the Tees Valley labour market are characterised by low-paid, insecure work, with the 
extension of zero hours contracts and informal forms of employment increasing.36 While overall 
employment has grown, average income and livings standards have failed to keep pace with the 
rise in new jobs during the last decade.37 
 
4.14 The TUC’s 2016-17 Campaign Plan promotes addressing the insecurity and precarious 
nature of employment, and its consequences for productivity, living standards, health and well-
being and prosperity.38 The TUC Decent Work Charter calls for a greater voice for workers on 
                                                            
33 Rafferty, A., Hughes, C. and Lupton, R. (2017) Inclusive Growth (IG) Monitor 2017: Local Enterprise 
Partnerships, Inclusive Growth Analysis Unit, University of Manchester: Manchester. 
34 Analysis is based on a range of variables or indicators grouped under two themes (inclusion and prosperity). 
Inclusion indicators cover income, living costs and labour market inclusion (e.g. unemployment), while prosperity 
indicators cover output, employment and human capital. 
35 RSA (2017) Inclusive Growth Commission: Making our economy work for everyone, Royal Society for the 
encouragement of Arts, Manufacturers and Commerce: London.  
36 Wearmouth, R. (2014) ‘Devastating’ number of North East people on zero-hours contracts says TUC’, The 
Chronicle, 15 December.  
37 Keiller, A. K. (2017) Living Standards, Poverty and inequality in the UK, Institute for Fiscal Studies: London.  
38 TUC (2016) TUC Campaign Plan 2016-17, Trades Union Congress: London.  
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the shop-floor and in the boardroom, decent pay, regular hours, fair treatment, healthy 
workplaces and learning opportunities. The Tees Valley Industrial Strategy will need to identify 
interventions that recognise the importance of quality work as a means of improving 
productivity and tackling poverty.  
 
4.15 Complementing the focus on the ‘world of work’ are contributions that are re-thinking 
‘conventional economic approaches’, based on community wealth, socially-just devolution, 
quality public services, investment in skills, decent work and local procurement; many elements 
of which have been pursued in Cleveland, USA and more recently in Preston (see Case Study).39 
There is also evidence from the Leeds City Region of how anchor institutions collectively spend 
£1.4bn on goods and services.40 The report, sponsored by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
(JRF), argues that, by using public procurement as a means of promoting inclusive growth, a 10 
per cent shift to local suppliers could boost the Leeds economy by up to £198m a year. Other 
measures include reviewing employment and recruitment practices and upgrading wages.  
 
 
                                                            
39 Jackson, M. and McIlroy, N. (2017) Community wealth building through anchor institutions, Centre for Local 
Economic Strategies: Manchester. Sheffield, H. (2017) ‘The Preston model: UK takes lessons from rust-belt 
Cleveland’, The Guardian, 11 April.  
40 Devins, D., Gold, J. Boak, G., Garvey R. and Willis P. (2017) Maximising the impact of local anchor institutions: 
the case of Leeds City Region, Joseph Rowntree Foundation: York.  
Case Study: Community wealth-building – the ‘Cleveland and Preston Models’ 
The concept of community wealth building is seen as a mechanism for tackling inequality and driving 
more inclusive growth by ensuring that place-based economic development is shared more equally 
amongst residents. The co-operative model has been promoted in Cleveland, USA, where worker co-
operatives that supply hospitals, councils and universities have been established in order to keep 
profits local. Redirecting local spending for community wealth through the use of worker co-
operatives has been labelled the ‘Cleveland Model’. In Preston, the city council commissioned the 
Centre for Local Economic Strategies (CLES), to help identify twelve large institutions anchored in 
Preston, including the city and the county council, the university, police and local hospital. CLES 
recommended redirecting the £1.2bn total annual spending of these anchor institutions to local 
businesses. Preston City Council has since spent an additional £4m locally, up from 14 per cent of its 
budget in 2012 to 28 per cent in 2016. The council is also looking to establish a local bank to provide 
loans to small businesses and also to become a municipal energy provider in order to develop a wider 
programme of generating and localising wealth for the benefit of Preston and its citizens. Other 
initiatives include setting up cooperative networks and encouraging students and graduates to launch 
their own cooperative businesses, part of a broader long-term approach to build a sustain a circular 
local economy and sustainable place. 
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4.16 In a community wealth-building model, the vision is for more places to “act 
locally…because economic re-localisation will be one of the inevitable impacts of the end of 
cheap transportation fuels”.41 
 
4.17 An important consideration when thinking about community-based wealth is the concept 
of the ‘foundational economy’ and the basic infrastructure required to support everyday societal 
needs, including how development should move beyond overt competition, narrow repetition, 
non-learning, centralisation and financialisation and towards an approach that is based on profit 
extraction rather than long-term sustainability.42 These elements are said to be features of a 
current economic model that is failing. Instead, the requirement is said to be for place-based 
industrial policies and strategies that emphasise the importance of core infrastructure assets and 
services; an issue advocated increasingly by economists concerned with fundamental questions of 
spatial inequalities in the UK.43 
 
Tools: Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 
 
4.18 CCS is a process where CO2 is captured from industrial and power facilities, piped 
offshore and injected into rocks under the North Sea, where it is stored permanently. CCS is said 
to represent a unique opportunity to reduce carbon emissions by up to 90 per cent at selected 
plants. CCS infrastructure is expected to attract new inward investment into Tees Valley and is 
seen as a national strategic asset for the UK, supporting the long-term sustainability and 
competitiveness of industry. 
 
“Tees Valley is very fortunate in a number of ways in relation to CCS. Firstly the geography is there 
and important. So it has a significant number of industries located in a very small geographical area. It 
has an inherent advantage, an industrial ecosystem advantage where you have multiple industrial sites 
linked with a lot of shared services and activities…and that lends itself extremely well to CCS. Given 
that CCS is the ability to share infrastructure in order to enable suitable economies of scale to reduce costs 
for companies” (Authors’ interview with trade association CEO, May 2017). 
                                                            
41 Adamson, D. and Lang, M. (2014) Towards a new settlement: a deep place approach to equitable and sustainable 
places, Regeneration Wales: Cardiff: p12, citing Heinberg, R. (2008) writing in a foreword in Hopkins, R. (ed.) The 
Transitions Handbook: From Oil Dependency to Local Resilience, Green Books: Totnes.  
42 See, for example: Bowman, A., Froud, J., Sukhdev, J. and Williams, K. (2013) The foundational economy: 
rethinking industrial policy, University of Manchester: Manchester. 
43 In a lecture (20 July 2017) for the Centre for Cities ‘City Horizons’ series, Professor Diane Coyle indicated that, 
while previously calling for people-based policies, she now advocated place-based development strategies as a means 
of tackling spatial inequalities, which included the provision for all places to have basic infrastructure services 
(www.centreforcities.org/multimedia/event-catch-city-horizons-prof-diane-coyle).   
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Tools: Skills 
 
4.19 Skill-levels in Tees Valley are lower than the national average due to the limited supply of 
and demand for lower and middle level skills, and there are also acute challenges with foundation 
(or basic) skills.44 During the course of our research, and in particular the stakeholder roundtable 
in Middlesbrough, participants called for improved labour market analysis and intelligence to 
anticipate and plan for the skills that will be needed to meet future job opportunities, and for 
skills to be a fundamental component of a Tees Valley Industrial Strategy.  
 
4.20 Fragmentation in the skills ‘system’, both nationally and locally, has long been highlighted 
as a particular challenge in England, and during the research interviews we heard calls for Tees 
Valley to build closer integration between Higher Education (HE), Further Education (FE) and 
school education, with suggestions that careers advice in schools needed to be reformed 
(especially in sciences) and integrated with careers services in post-16 education. The Tees Valley 
Employment and Skills Board is identified as an important facilitating actor in this regard. The 
                                                            
44 In basic skills, England is said to be the only country in the OECD where 16 to 24-year olds are ‘no more literate 
or numerate than 55 to 64-year olds’, according to a blog by Professor Andy Westwood, ‘Industrial Strategy and 
Skills: Getting it right this time’, University of Manchester (10 July).  
Case Study: Teesside Collective and CCS 
Teesside Collective (TC) is a cluster of energy-intensive industries on Tees Valley that have a shared 
vision to establish Tees Valley as the preferred location for future clean industrial development by 
creating Europe’s first CCS-equipped industrial zone. TC is a unique industrial cluster, and in 2015 it 
published a blueprint for delivering Industrial CCS in the UK, which received widespread support from 
business, environmental groups, the public sector and academics. TC is pushing for regulatory and 
financial support from government – including the development of a clear, long-term CCS policy and 
viable investment mechanism. In September 2016, the Parliamentary Advisory Group on CCS, led by 
Lord Oxburgh looked at business models for CCS hubs. TC was keen to expand upon the Oxburgh 
report and examine the commercial realities of progressing CCS. This resulted in a further piece of work 
commissioned by TC, in October 2016, which examined the financial means of getting CCS off the 
ground. The findings from this study were published in February 2017, and it injected some commercial 
realities into the CCS project by identifying a viable business model, and outlining the financial 
contribution required of government and industry. The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy (BEIS) has been keen to understand the financial costs and benefits of CCS. A number of 
companies in Tees Valley are keen on the area pushing ahead and going ‘first’ on CCS. The resources 
needed to build the infrastructure for CCS extend far beyond the capacity of the Tees Valley Mayor’s 
Investment Fund. However, the Mayor of Tees Valley is expected to play a strong political role lobbying 
UK Government for investment and making the case national support. Estimates suggest that new 
investment will see 1,200 jobs created during the construction phase, helping to retain 5,900 jobs whilst 
in operation, and enabling the UK to meet its climate change targets. 
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role of Teesside University, acting as a crucial anchor institution, will also be important. As a 
significant employer and teaching and research institution, Teesside University is working with 
the Tees Valley Combined Authority and Durham University to facilitate the contribution of 
Teesside University to implementing the Tees Valley SEP, supported by the Local Government 
Association/Higher Education Funding Council for England’s Leading Places programme.45 
 
4.21 There are particular financial challenges facing some FE institutions, with dwindling 
numbers of future 16-18 year old students in the pipeline, and a demographic upturn not 
expected for five years. This is likely to drive the demand for greater collaboration and 
partnership between different education actors and institutions.46 At the same time, the FE 
sector in the North East (including Tees Valley) is said to have performed well over the past five 
years, despite the internal and external challenges facing colleges and other providers.47 
 
4.22 The Tees Valley Industrial Strategy will need to increase the demand for skills 
(particularly technical skills) and encourage more firms to train or increase their demand for 
higher skills. Here, trade unions can play a vital role, encouraging employers to invest more of 
their own resources in workforce training. This includes apprenticeships, where the new 
Apprenticeship Levy has been launched. There is a perception that the Levy will have surpluses, 
particularly in the initially phases, and our research has suggested that employers and unions are 
keen to see any surpluses reinvested locally, and new flexibilities also introduced for the use of 
the Levy, which would better-reflect the distinct nature of the Tees Valley labour market.  
 
4.23 In order to match the opportunities and challenges of the Tees Valley labour market and 
economy, the Tees Valley Devolution Deal has called for the devolution of the Adult Education 
Budget. Local devolution of the Adult Education Budget is predicated on the increased ability of 
places to make the national skills system work more effectively for distinct local labour markets 
and economies. In Sheffield City Region, for example, the ‘Skills Made Easy’ project and 
Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre have been instrumental in helping Sheffield construct 
a flexible skills system that is able to match the needs of the local labour market/economy. 
                                                            
45 www.local.gov.uk/topics/devolution/leading-places  
46 Tees Valley was one of the first places to undertake an FE Area Review. However, our understanding, based on 
research interviews and secondary data analysis, is that few, if any, of the recommendations in the Area Review final 
report have been implemented to date.  
47 According to a report by ippr north (2016) Tipping the balance: Maximising the North East as a skills hub, ippr 
north: Manchester, between 2005/06 and 2012/13, the North East saw the second-highest rate of growth for any 
English region in further education attainments at Level 2, with only London enjoying a higher rate.  
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These were specific tools that Sheffield City Region used, a part of a broader package, to attract 
world-class manufacturing investment from Boeing and McLaren. In seeking to attract national 
and international investment, particularly in the low carbon economy, Tees Valley will itself also 
need to persuade companies that the local skills system can produce sufficient quantity and 
quality of labour to support new and continued investment. Hence, more local control and 
discretion over the Adult Education Budget. Tees Valley’s local skills system will need to be agile 
and responsive to new investment opportunities when they arise, and should be viewed as a 
fundamental component of business growth, innovation and investment strategies.  
 
Tools: Infrastructure 
 
4.24 Tees Valley has significant infrastructure assets and systems, including port facilities that 
provides Tees Valley with a distinct competitive advantage on account of the local area’s 
geographical position, sites and land-holdings. Tees Valley also has an abundance of utilities (e.g. 
energy, water resources and waste processing) 
 
4.25 Strategic infrastructure in Tees Valley is said to be good, but enhancements are required 
to local transport infrastructure. In the past month, Tees Valley Combined Authority, in 
partnership with the five local Councils and Highways England, has published new proposals for 
building better transport connections across Tees Valley. Proposals include a new Tees Crossing, 
alleviating pressure from the A19 Tees Viaduct, and enhanced east-west connectivity with 
improvements to the A66 between the A1(M) and Teesport, which includes a new Darlington 
Bypass.48 
 
4.26 The new Tees Valley Land Commission is expected to lead on large parts of 
infrastructure planning and development, with a particular role in identifying sites, facilitating 
assembly arrangements, and devising options over the use of land for employment, residential 
and recreational purposes. And in the South Tees area, the new Mayoral Development 
Corporation will be preparing a master-plan setting out plans for development and potential 
investment on the former SSI site and vicinity (see below). 
 
                                                            
48 TVCA (2017) Mayor launches ambitious plans to transform road network, (11 July), Tees Valley Combined 
Authority: Stockton-on-Tees.  
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4.27 There are also limits to existing energy infrastructure capacity in Tees Valley, in terms of 
connectivity into the National Grid, which is critical for maintaining current output as well as the 
future planning of new energy power plant assets, and for maintaining energy security and 
supporting locally-distributed power sources. Given the scale of energy infrastructure capacity 
and requirements in Tees Valley, and because the area is ideally-placed to host new forms of 
renewable energy generation, Tees Valley should be firmly on the radar of the National 
Infrastructure Commission and Infrastructure Projects Authority, and in particular the 
forthcoming National Infrastructure Assessment (NIA),49 which should sit alongside 
complementary local and regional (including Tees Valley) infrastructure plans.50 The Combined 
Authority should also look to support the Core Cities Group suggestion that cities and city-
regions would benefit from stronger coordination of national infrastructure regulation in order 
to generate greater capital investment in infrastructure.51 
  
Tools: Funding and Financing Investment  
 
4.28 Where to source the funding and financing to support infrastructure renewal and 
maintenance in Tees Valley echoes the challenges faced by cities and city-regions across the 
world. For public authorities, such as the Tees Valley Mayoral Combined Authority, the task will 
be to identify a range of different public and private capital and revenue resource mechanisms 
that can be used to upgrade, build, operate and maintain critical infrastructure (see Table 5). This 
will require investment that is noticeably long-term, patient and ‘sticky’ and moves towards 
reversing the UK’s problem of short-term and under-investment in infrastructure (Figure 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
49 The National Infrastructure Commission (NIC) has been tasked by the UK Government to develop a National 
Infrastructure Assessment. The NIC will be responsible for identifying and recommending projects and 
programmes for Government and private investment.  
50 iBUILD (2015) Infrastructure Manifesto and Mid-term Review, iBUILD Infrastructure Research Centre, 
University of Newcastle: Newcastle upon Tyne.  
51 Core Cities (2017) Invest Reform Trust: A Core Cities UK Green Paper for a Fairer, Stronger Britain, Core Cities: 
Manchester.  
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Figure 5: Gross fixed capital formation as a % of GDP (1980 – 2015) 
 
Source: World Bank (data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.GDI.FTOT.ZH).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
France USA Germany UK
32 
 
Table 5: Infrastructure funding and financing mechanisms 
Funding 
Public sector (tax) revenue 
sources 
Joint public and private 
revenue sources 
 
Private sector (market) 
revenue sources 
Taxes and assessments 
Availability and other public 
sector payments 
Grants 
Land and property sales  
Other contributions (e.g. tax 
credits) 
Joint development and 
commercial activity (e.g. asset 
backed vehicles) 
Regulated asset based 
Project-generated revenues 
(e.g. charges, tolls, 
user/consumer fees) 
Real estate developer 
contributions 
Other commercial revenues 
(e.g. land sales, provision of 
other services to users, 
sponsorship) 
Crowdfunding 
Financing 
Public Joint public and private 
 
Private 
Pay-as-you-go: taxes, fees and 
grants 
Local/public authority 
reserves 
Government gilts 
National government loans 
(e.g. UK Public Works Loan 
Board) 
Supranational body loans and 
other instruments (e.g. 
European Investment Bank 
JESSICA, Project Bonds) 
Equity 
Public sector pension funds 
Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Sovereign guarantees 
Public private partnerships 
Pay-as-you-go: project 
generated and other 
commercial revenues 
Banks (e.g. debt finance, 
loans) 
Pension and insurance funds 
(e.g. debt finance, loans) 
Capital markets (e.g. 
municipal and special 
purpose vehicle bonds) 
Project finance 
Secondary markets (e.g. 
infrastructure funds) 
Source: Adapted from Strickland, T. (2015) ‘The financialisation of infrastructure funding and financing in the UK 
and the US’, Unpublished PhD thesis, CURDS, Newcastle University: Newcastle upon Tyne. 
 
 
4.29 Given the scale of required infrastructure investment in Tees Valley (e.g. CCS), there is a 
joint role for the UK Government (which can borrow capital at the lowest interest rate (Table 
6)), Tees Valley Combined Authority and private investors. The UK Government can de-risk 
private investment by providing infrastructure guarantees.52 The importance of ‘indigenous’ 
private investment in Tees Valley (e.g. Able UK, Sabic, PD Ports and Sembcorp, etc.) has also 
given markets and other investors’ confidence to invest as long as there is a stable policy and 
market environment and there is a pipeline of projects. During our research, the private sector 
                                                            
52 As part of ‘Pillar 3’ of the UK Industrial Strategy Green Paper ‘Upgrading Infrastructure’ the UK Government 
confirmed that it will be extending the UK Infrastructure Guarantee Scheme until 2026. Under the Scheme, the 
Government guarantees debt in exchange for a guarantee fee. This provides sovereign-backed debt, thus making 
infrastructure projects more affordable on the back of the UK Government balance sheet.  
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outlined the importance of optimism, timeliness and pace (and equally action and substance) 
when it comes to developing and implementing investment. International firms stand ready to 
make investments in Tees Valley, but they are seeking a clear vision and strategy from the UK 
Government, in relation to industrial and energy policy, the long-term direction of the UK 
economy, and the UK’s future relationship with the EU and wider world. Of particular concern 
is future access to sources of finance from EU bodies, such as the European Investment Bank, 
which have invested heavily in UK energy and other infrastructure in recent years (Figure 6), and 
amidst suggestions that the EIB has instigated a moratorium on investment in new UK 
projects.53   
 
Table 6: Financing costs of UK government borrowing and private finance (estimated in 
2012-13) Whole of Government Accounts 
Type of debt Debt level over the 
year (£bn) 
Financing costs in 
year (£bn) 
Implied interest 
rate (%) 
Government 
borrowing 
965.5-996.2 33.2 3.3-3.4 
Private finance 
(including finance 
leases) 
41.4-41.9 3.1 7.4-7.5 
Source: NAO (2015) ‘The choice of finance for capital investment’, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General, The Stationery Office: London. 
 
4.30 In encouraging the financial sector to invest in the economy, pension and insurance 
investment can provide longer-term, stable forms of patient capital. The recent announcement 
surrounding the proposed investment by the Tees Valley Pension Fund of up to £200m of 
investment into the Tees Valley economy is a welcome development.54 This investment will 
mitigate the existing constrained fiscal capacity (space) of Tees Valley, especially amongst its 
constituent local authorities (see below). In thinking about the innovative use of existing assets, 
local authorities, the Combined Authority and other public bodies may also want to build on the 
current One Public Estate programme and explore the possibility of creating a Tees Valley 
Wealth Fund to capture value and uplift from physical/economic assets, activity and reinvest 
income locally for the long-term.  
 
 
                                                            
53 Wright, O. (2017) ‘European Investment Bank cuts off cash for British building projects due to Brexit’, The 
Times, 22 August: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/brexit-eu-bank-cuts-off-cash-for-british-building-projects-
s2qvc66z2  
54 TVCA (2017) Local Pension Fund to Invest £200 Million to Boost the Tees Valley Economy, 27 July, Tees Valley 
Combined Authority: Stockton-on-Tees.  
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Figure 6: European Investment Bank lending in the UK (2012-2016) (Euro m) 
 
Source: EIB (2017) The EIB in the United Kingdom, European Investment Bank: Luxembourg: 
http://www.eib.org/projects/regions/european-union/united-kingdom/index.htm  
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Tools: Place Attractiveness and Inward Investment 
 
4.31 As the UK leaves the EU, it will be essential that Tees Valley and other similar places are 
supported to maintain and expand trading relationships with the EU and other international 
markets. Our research identified strong support for a pro-active programme of marketing and 
promotion of Tees Valley as a means of overcoming negative perceptions about the area and 
Tees Valley and Brexit 
Tees Valley saw, on average, across the five local authority areas, a 64 per cent vote for the UK to 
leave the EU. Athey’s 2017 study identified places that are more vulnerable to Brexit 
(www.mylocaleconomy.org/brexit-potential-impacts-for-local-economies),-highlighted local 
economies reliant on industries that are significant exporters, at risk of offshoring to the EU, deeply-
embedded in international supply chains, dependent on EU migrant workers, and home to low-
income communities that will be vulnerable to rising inflation resulting from tariff barriers and the 
depreciation of sterling against other currencies. The results suggest Tees Valley is not in the highest 
overall vulnerability category (top 30). Recent Centre for Cities and LSE Centre for Economic 
Performance research on Brexit and cities (‘Brexit, trade and the economic impact on Cities’) suggests 
that successful cities with large, high-skilled service sectors – which are mainly in the South of 
England – will be hit hardest by any downturn in trade after the UK leaves the EU, regardless of 
whether the UK faces a ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ Brexit. However, these cities will be better-placed to adapt to 
economic shocks than less affluent places outside the South East – despite the latter being less 
directly affected by Brexit. There are parallels with the Global Financial Crisis – according to the CEP 
technical report underpinning the Centre for Cities research, which states that, “we highlight the 
parallel with the financial crisis, and specifically the contrast between the immediate and long run 
impacts (which saw London and the South East hit hardest before recovering much more strongly 
than other areas of the UK). This suggests that even though the immediate negative impacts are 
smaller in poorer regions, households in those areas start off poorer and may experience considerably 
more difficulty in adjusting to those negative shocks” (p2). Analysis by the Institute for Fiscal Studies 
(https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/9562) suggests that “uncertainties over tariffs and the exchange 
rate mean that UK households are potentially going to be affected by considerable and unpredictable 
changes in food prices, with the poorest households much more exposed to this risk than the richest 
households”, which would have profound implications for places such as Tees Valley. Uncertainty 
over Brexit would impact upon businesses, particularly manufacturers who need to take long-term 
planning and investment decisions. The North East (including Tees Valley) exports a higher 
proportion of manufactured goods to the EU than the average for the UK. This position is further 
compounded by the high levels of FDI attracted to the region as a potential entry point to the Single 
European Market. There is a need to address two issues: First, is to ensure continued access to core 
European markets for priority sectors, such as chemicals and advanced manufacturing; and second to 
develop new trading arrangements and support for Tees Valley firms in diversifying international 
trade activity to faster growing non-European markets. There are also questions about the supply of 
EU labour, in certain sectors, and research and funding issues for Teesside University and commercial 
research activities. Tees Valley is currently the second largest recipient per capita in England of 
European Structural Funds (ESIF) (£245 per head, Cornwall: £920). Unless replacement funds are 
secured then there is a potential loss of £131m (total allocation of £170m) of direct financial support 
to Tees Valley. In a post-ESIF landscape (Shared Prosperity Fund, State Aids, etc.), Tees Valley will 
need to make the case for more devolved, flexible and agile local growth funding, and push for the 
‘repatriation’ of powers and funding from EU to UK that follow the path of devolution. 
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highlighting the distinct locational assets and benefits to national and international firms and 
individuals from investing in the local economy: 
 
“Tees Valley has to invest more in FDI attraction and support. We need to use leverage in whatever way 
possible to attract investment to Tees Valley. There have been a number of examples where Tees Valley’s 
physical assets and location has been critical to attracting new investment (e.g. the Mobi Project on the 
SSI site, which was launched at Teesside University in May 2017) (Authors’ interview with business 
membership body CEO, June 2017). 
 
4.32 Further investment in FDI promotion and attraction, alongside policies and strategies to 
strengthen indigenous business and enterprise, given the patterns of reinvestment by firms 
already based in Tees Valley, was said by those we interviewed to form part of a broader 
approach around generational expectations and aspirations and an appeal to potential talent. At 
the heart of the programme should be strong and effective joint working between the Tees 
Valley Combined Authority and DIT/UKTI, especially around sourcing and identifying leads 
and sharing intelligence and information, and ensuring that Tees Valley is a part of the proposed 
DIT/UKTI ‘Northern Powerhouse FDI Strategy. Equally, there should be a ‘collective’ 
approach to inward investment and promotion, which uses the skills and attributes of different 
actors and institutions, including national and local political institutions, business, HE and FE 
sectors and trade unions, which was pivotal in securing the Hitachi investment in Newton 
Aycliffe, County Durham: 
 
“Tees Valley doesn’t have a high profile both nationally and internationally. There needs to be a greater 
degree of coordination. That is where I see the creation of the Mayoral Development Corporation and the 
success of the Combined Authority, that issue of strategic coordination. Investors need access to particular 
assets, such as land, electricity supply, a skilled workforce, innovation & research…so it’s about 
recognising the bespoke needs of inward investor and being able to put a package together for them” 
(Authors’ interview with company CEO, April 2017).  
 
Tools: Anticipating, Avoiding and Mitigating Industrial Shocks 
 
4.33 Following the closure of the SSI steel-works in Redcar, and previous economic shocks, 
resulting in attempted efforts to deal with the consequences of de-industrialisation, we thought it 
important to consider what lessons, if any, could be learned from industrial taskforces and 
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institutional interventions. This is of further importance given that responding to industrial 
shocks is an element of an active industrial strategy. It is beyond the scope of this project to 
outline in detail the circumstances and events leading up to and during the closure of the SSI site, 
but nevertheless some of the experiences relayed to us during the research interviews were of 
such breadth and depth that it should be incumbent upon policy-makers and decision-makers to 
capture, analyse and identify how to anticipate and manage the potential consequences of plant 
closure. In particular, the role of union officials and lay representatives at SSI should not be 
under-played, in identifying issues, working with management, convening mechanisms and 
helping workers adapt to change, which is a source of strength for the trade union movement 
and Tees Valley. Union involvement and engagement in labour market tracking/support and site 
legacy proposals has been critical, as the search for catalytic development (dependent on cost of 
decontamination and sourcing new industrial usages), is sought and responsibility passes to the 
new Mayoral Development Corporation. In the aftermath of plant closures, there could also be 
lessons to learn from similar examples in Rotherham, Llanwern, Hallside and the Ruhr 
(Bochum).  
 
4.34 Having the ability to gather and marshal intelligence and resources locally on the ground, 
and Government, working with devolved institutions, such as the Tees Valley Combined 
Authority, and the private sector and unions, will be critical to anticipating and dealing with rapid 
technological and market changes in certain sectors. The steps being taken by the Combined 
Authority to strengthen the Authority’s analytical capacity are important, and should 
complement activity to improve foresight, analysis and intelligence in support of Tees Valley’s 
ability to predict, plan and manage potential industrial shocks in the future. In considering this 
report, the TUC may wish to (re)make the case to the UK Government, as part of a national 
Industrial Strategy, for certain strategic industries, such as steel, to be supported more actively so 
that products and processes can be put to greater use for the benefit of national and local 
economies.  
 
Actors: Local Authorities 
 
4.35 The five local authorities in Tees Valley (Darlington, Hartlepool, Middlesbrough, Redcar 
and Cleveland and Stockton-on-Tees) are some of the smallest unitary local authorities in the 
country. However, like most authorities, Tees Valley’s councils have faced austerity since 2010 
(Figure 7), resulting in significant reductions in capacity and programmes, policies, public 
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services and employment (e.g. redundancies, public sector wage freezes and/or reductions and 
pension reforms). At the same time, demand and pressures on services, such as adult social care, 
has increased, and yet local authorities remain vital anchor institutions, leading by example in the 
public sector in the fairness at work and public procurement agendas. Nationally, excluding 
grants for education, police and fire services, local authority revenues in England in 2009-10 
were £59 billion. In 2016-17 council revenues were £44 billion or 26 per cent lower.55  
 
Figure 7: Real-terms % change in local government service spending against % of grant 
income between 2009/10 – 2016/17 
 
Source: IFS (2016) Council-level figures on spending cuts and business rates income, Institute of Fiscal Studies: 
London. 
 
4.36 The UK has a highly centralised system of taxation and expenditure in an international 
context (Table 7). UK local authorities have traditionally relied heavily upon inter-governmental 
transfers rather than local fiscal autonomy. However, the Government has changed the nature of 
funding for local authorities in England, in order to provide ‘incentives’ for local growth. This 
has created financial opportunities for some local authorities, but has also increased financial 
risks and uncertainty for others. The move towards Business Rates Retention, which has been 
the centre-piece of the Government’s efforts to decentralise local government funding in 
England, has seen the introduction of a 50 per cent retention scheme and plans were earmarked 
                                                            
55 IFS (2016) A time of revolution: British local government finance in the 2010s, Institute for Fiscal Studies: 
London.  
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for 100 per cent retention. However, in the run-up to the May 2017 General Election, the 
Finance Bill, which was being taken through Parliament, and would have provided the statutory 
mechanism for 100 per cent retention was dropped. The Government has since come forward 
with new proposals to run new pilot schemes amongst councils of 100 per cent retention. Tees 
Valley will need to consider carefully its response to this initiative given that the Government has 
also announced the end of the national Revenue Support Grant to local authorities.  
 
Table 7: Tax Set at Each Level of Government as a Percentage of GDP (2011) 
 Local 
Government 
State/Regional 
Government 
Local + 
State/Regional 
Central 
Government 
Social 
Security 
Total 
Canada 3.1 12.2 15.3 12.8 2.9 31.0 
France 5.8 0 5.8 14.4 23.9 44.2 
Germany 3.0 7.9 10.9 11.8 14.3 37.1 
Italy 6.8 0 6.3 22.6 13.4 42.9 
Spain 3.0 7.3 10.8 9.5 11.7 31.6 
Sweden 15.9 0 15.9 22.8 5.6 44.5 
United 
Kingdom 
1.7 0 1.7 26.9 6.7 35.5 
United 
States 
3.9 5.2 9.1 10.3 5.7 25.1 
OECD 
(2010) 
3.9 5.0 8.9 20.2 8.3 33.8 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics Comparative tables, http://tinyurl.com/revenuestatistics   
 
4.37 Whatever model of Business Rate Retention scheme emerges, for Tees Valley’s local 
authorities it will be important that some form of fiscal transfer and equalisation mechanism 
continues, given the limited fiscal space that exists within Tees Valley councils. For examples, the 
largest local authority, Darlington, has estimated Business Rate returns of £79.4 million in 2017-
18, and together with the four other authorities in Tees Valley generates only 13 per cent of the 
annual Business Rate revenue of one individual London Borough (Westminster).56 
 
4.38 Financial pressures are driving greater collaboration between local authorities, and in 
Tees Valley such collaborations have been a feature of the governance of local and regional 
economic development landscape for the past twenty years. Tees Valley local authorities have 
provided a ‘model’ of joint-working and partnership, and have invested time and resources into 
building shared strategic capacity.  
 
 
                                                            
56 Based on NNDR forecasts and estimates for 2017-18.  
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Actors: Tees Valley Metro Mayor and Combined Authority 
 
4.39 Like Greater Manchester, albeit on a smaller scale, Tees Valley is seen as something of a 
‘flagship’ for decentralisation in England, outside London. While devolution is an important tool 
for economic development and industrial strategy, national government retains an important 
role, and multi-level working between Government, devolved and local authorities remains 
essential. The Tees Valley Industrial Strategy should be a local initiative, but Tees Valley will 
remain dependent upon international and national investment and reliant upon working with 
Government and the private sector when it comes making investments in Tees Valley as Tees 
Valley cannot fund everything locally even if it achieved full devolution. As the Core Cities 
(2017) suggests, “place-based policy doesn’t mean just devolving everything to the city authority. 
That might be the right answer, in other cases policy should be national, or a combination of the 
two. It does however mean deciding objectively what the right level and scale is to deliver what’s 
in the best interests of that place”.57   
 
4.40 This means that Tees Valley will have to consider how best to influence national policy 
from a source of strength, and identify the material national policy issues that it needs to see 
changing in order to enable effective local devolution and agency: 
 
“Biggest challenge is for Tees Valley to punch above its weight. It is such a small economic area, and 
there is a potential difficulty of getting five Labour local authority leaders to work effectively with a 
Conservative Metro Mayor. Tees Valley is competing against Greater Manchester and the West 
Midlands so it needs to work effectively together and use its devolved powers” (Authors’ interview with 
business membership body CEO, June 2017). 
 
4.41 Asymmetric devolved powers and responsibilities are a feature of the Mayoral Combined 
Authority Deals (Table 8). Our research suggests that there is a broad acceptance that different 
places require different powers and arrangements, and that is seen as the underpinning concept 
of devolution. For example, given the SSI site closure, the emergence of a new Mayoral 
Development Corporation is regarded as vital component of the Tees Valley Industrial Strategy 
(see Case Study). In addition, importance is also attached to the ‘softer powers’ that the Tees 
Valley Metro Mayor and Combined Authority could deploy, with the recent announcement by 
                                                            
57 Core Cities (2017) Invest Reform Trust: A Core Cities UK Green Paper for a Fairer, Stronger Britain, Core Cities: 
Manchester; p8. 
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the Tees Valley Pension Fund of £200 million of investment in Tees Valley seen as an 
illustration of the ability of new institutions to enable change and development outside the 
boundaries of formal devolved arrangements.  
 
“The motivations for Tees Valley pushing for a Mayoral Devolution Deal lay in a desire within the area 
to move away from a situation where Tees Valley was dependent on decisions being made in central 
government. Devolution gives Tees Valley the opportunity for strategies to be locally-led. England is a 
very centralised country. We continually have to go cap in hand to government. These are modest 
devolutionary steps. The government holds many of the levers. If we can do more things ourselves then we 
can move away from a short-term approach. That doesn’t help to make transformational change. We 
need long-term programmes” (Authors’ interview with official, Tees Valley Combined Authority, May 
2017). 
 
4.42 Research elsewhere by University College London and CURDS has suggested that there 
are six ‘tests’ for the new Metro Mayors against which performance will be assessed, which 
includes: achieving inclusive and equitable growth; unlocking policy problems; higher voter 
turnouts; improvements on other forms of sub-national governance; and avoiding the over-
concentration of power.58 
 
                                                            
58 Tomaney, J., Pike, A., O’Brien, P. and Jenkins, M. (2017) ‘Metro Mayors: claims and evidence’, paper submitted to 
Political Quarterly, Bartlett School of Planning, University College London, CURDS, Newcastle University.  
Case Study: South Tees Development Corporation 
The concept of a Mayoral Development Corporation (MDC) for Tees Valley, following the collapse 
of the SSI steelworks, in 2015, was a key proposal in the Tees Valley Devolution Deal. The intention 
to create a development corporation in the South Tees area was part of the long-term response to the 
closure of the SSI plant, to drive forward growth and investment, create jobs and support local 
communities. As part of the process to establish the Corporation, the Combined Authority undertook 
a statutory consultation. Overall, responses to the consultation were positive and in agreement with 
the proposals. On 9 June 2017, the new Tees Valley Mayor designated the South Tees area as a MDC 
area and submitted a formal request to the Secretary of State to establish the STDC. Tees Valley is the 
first area outside London to benefit from these powers. Due to start its work in August, STDC, 
chaired by the Tees Valley Mayor, will unveil a regeneration master plan for 4,500 acres in September, 
and it will have statutory powers over seven square miles, including the former SSI site and access to 
Teesport. The site provides an environment for industrial use, with land available for new investment 
in the process and energy sectors. STDC will also have specific planning and compulsory purchasing 
powers and will have flexibility to attract new investment and business (utilising planning and tax 
incentives). The MDC will be able to retain any income that is generated from the site, under the 
auspices of the Mayoral Combined Authority. 
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Table 8: Funding, powers and responsibilities in Mayoral Devolution Deals 
 C&P 
 
GM LCR TV WM WoE 
30-year 
investment 
fund 
£600m £900m £900 £450m £1.1bn £900m 
Education 
& skills 
Apprenticeship 
Grant for 
Employers. 
Adult 
Education 
Budget. 
Post-16 FE 
system. 
Apprenticeship 
Grant for 
Employers. 
Adult 
Education 
Budget. 
Post-16 FE 
system. 
Apprenticeship 
Grant for 
Employers. 
Adult 
Education 
Budget. 
Post-16 FE 
system. 
Adult 
Education 
Budget. 
Adult 
Education 
Budget. 
Apprenticeship 
Grant for 
Employers. 
Adult 
Education 
Budget. 
Post-16 FE 
system. 
Housing 
& 
planning 
£170m 
affordable 
housing grant. 
Strategic 
planning.  
Mayoral 
Development 
Corporations. 
 
£30m a year 
Housing 
Investment 
Fund.  
Strategic 
Planning. 
Land 
Commission. 
Mayoral 
Development 
Corporations. 
Strategic 
planning. 
Compulsory 
purchasing 
powers. 
Mayoral 
Development 
Corporations. 
Control of Key 
Route 
Network.  
Mayoral 
Development 
Corporations.  
Compulsory 
purchasing 
powers 
Strategic 
planning. 
Compulsory 
purchasing 
powers. 
Mayoral 
Development 
Corporations.  
Transport Consolidated 
transport 
budget. Local 
roads network. 
Bus 
franchising. 
Smart 
ticketing.  
Consolidated 
transport 
budget. Local 
roads network. 
Bus 
franchising. 
Smart 
ticketing. 
Consolidated 
transport 
budget. Local 
roads network. 
Bus 
franchising. 
Smart 
ticketing. 
Consolidated 
transport 
budget.  
Consolidated 
transport 
budget. 
Local roads 
network. 
Bus 
franchising. 
Smart 
ticketing. 
Consolidated 
transport 
budget. Local 
roads network. 
Bus 
franchising. 
Smart 
ticketing. 
Health & 
social care 
Planning for 
health and 
social care 
integration.  
Control of 
£6bn 
integrated 
health and 
social care 
budget.  
Planning for 
health and 
social care 
integration.  
   
Source: Adapted from Centre for Cities (2017) Everything you need to know about Metro Mayors: An FAQ, Centre 
for Cities London. 
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Actors: UK Government 
 
4.43 Clearly the UK Government retains a particular interest and significant role in supporting 
the development and implementation of a Tees Valley Industrial Strategy, not least because of 
the locational advantages and position of Tees Valley within the UK political economy, but also 
because of the fiscal capacity of national government to intervene and support Tees Valley in 
creating a more productive, inclusive and sustainable economy. At the roundtable in 
Middlesbrough, we were given a very clear message by stakeholders that, even if Tees Valley 
were to be given significant new devolved powers and resources, it would still require the 
Government to underwrite or make direct investments to support the ambitions within the Tees 
Valley Industrial Strategy, on account of the scale of the opportunities and challenges facing the 
local economy. Partnership with Government will be important going forward.  
 
4.44 Attention is turning to how the UK Government is approaching Brexit negotiations and 
the forthcoming Industrial Strategy White Paper, with an expectation that the Government will 
impart a place-sensitive approach to both issues, and will utilise the new and emergent 
decentralised and devolved institutional arrangements in England, including the Tees Valley 
Metro Mayor and Combined Authority.59 For Tees Valley, a key tactic will be to make evidence-
based pitches to Government about the role of Tees Valley in UK Industrial Strategy, and what 
the UK Strategy should look like in Tees Valley.  
 
Actors: Trade Unions 
 
4.45 Trade unions are part of the traditional, economic and industrial ‘fabric’ of Tees Valley 
and the North East of England, and have in the past played strategic and ‘delivery’ roles in 
industrial policy and strategy at a regional level, albeit to varying degrees and at various times.60 
 
“We have developed relationships with employers. But there is an education process that we can get 
involved in. There has to be a central role for trade unions [in industrial strategy]. We want people to 
have good, sustainable employment. Successful companies are good for unions and members” (Authors’ 
interview with trade union official, April 2017). 
                                                            
59 A British Academy study has suggested that national policy is largely ‘place-blind’ treating everywhere as if it were 
the same and imposing blanket solutions, top down (British Academy (2016) Where We Live: 
http://www.britac.ac.uk/where-we-live-now  
60 O’Brien, P. (2005) ‘Devolution, Regionalisation and the Trades Union Congress (TUC)’, Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies (CURDS), Newcastle University.  
44 
 
 
4.46 Since 2010, no formal vehicles have existed for automatic union engagement and voice in 
local and regional development institutions. Unions have had to find ways of working with LEPs 
and Combined Authorities in the absence of national guidance and statutory regulation, and with 
the advent of Metro Mayors existing relationships will have to be deepened and new 
relationships formed, across the political spectrum. The case studies below illustrate how unions 
and Regional TUCs are working with the new Metro Mayors and Combined Authorities in the 
Liverpool City Region, Greater Manchester and West Midlands. While these arrangements will 
reflect, to some degree, the nature of the individual devolution arrangements in these city-
regions, they also demonstrate how Metro Mayors and Combined Authorities value the 
contribution and support of unions and the TUC in economic and industrial policy and strategy. 
We would encourage the Tees Valley Metro Mayor and Combined Authority to work with 
unions and the Northern TUC to identify mechanisms by which the trade unions can support 
the development and implementation of a Tees Valley Industrial Strategy.  
 
4.47 The TUC has been pushing centrally-promoted guidance on union engagement with 
future devolution deals through a framework for action. However, the Government is reluctant 
to adopt a central guide that champions social partnership approach to devolution, arguing that 
deals should come from the ‘bottom-up’. The TUC is, though, continuing to use the framework 
for action as a model for engagement at the regional level, and it has three strands: 
 
 Public service workforce partnership councils bringing together employers, councillors 
and unions in order to protect  employment standards and to promote workforce voice, 
including recognition and collective bargaining at the appropriate level.  
 Civil society partnerships bringing NGOs, voluntary and community groups, unions, 
businesses, academia and others together to set out the key outcomes that devolution will 
deliver for the devolved region, including equality, anti-poverty, decent jobs, strong 
public services and tackling exclusion. 
 A commissioning and procurement framework that promotes new models of public 
service delivery, including in-house services and public to public partnerships. 
 
“The Combined Authority allows us to have more of a direct dialogue with the unions and discuss issues such 
as inclusive and sustainable growth. The unions have a role in shouting about really large projects and 
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companies that we want to bring to Tees Valley. There needs to be more advocacy from the unions” (Authors’ 
interview with official, Tees Valley Combined Authority, May 2017). 
 
 
4.48 The TUC and unions long-promoted active industrial policy, drawing upon evidence of 
‘what works’ in other (high productive) advanced economies. Unions are able to encourage 
aspiration and the career progression of their members and workers. Whether it is promoting a 
just transition to a low carbon economy, encouraging greater fairness at work, skills development 
or workplace health and well-being, unions are ideally-placed to work with institutions, such as 
Case Study: Trade union engagement with Mayoral Combined Authorities (Liverpool City 
Region) 
Liverpool City Region Metro Mayor’s manifesto made a range of commitments relating to union 
representation and civic engagement, including: formally involving unions, businesses, academics, 
voluntary and community organisations in the Combined Authority’s governance structure. The 
Mayor is establishing a ‘City Region Fair Employment Charter’, focusing on issues including paying 
the Real Living Wage, minimising the use of zero-hours contracts, recognising and working with 
unions, procuring locally, engaging with the social economy, quality apprenticeships, investing in their 
workforce and promoting gender equality. On equalities, a ‘Fairness and Social Justice Advisory 
Board’ is being tasked with reviewing all mayoral and Combined Authority policy and practice. The 
Board will also give a voice to all disadvantaged and marginalised groups and bring together 
representatives from the social economy, faith and community groups, large and small businesses, 
and young people. 
Case Study: Trade union engagement with Mayoral Combined Authorities (Greater 
Manchester) 
In Greater Manchester, the Workforce Engagement Board and (health and social care- specific) 
Workforce Engagement Forum, established by the Protocol for Working on Joint Workforce Matters 
in 2015, have held quarterly meetings since January 2016. The TUC’s North West Public Services 
Committee has agreed that unions will rotate participation in these meetings according to each agenda. 
Other priorities include: Continuity of service: exploring how to extend continuous service provisions 
for voluntary staff movement across local government and health and social care in Greater 
Manchester. Social Value/Public Capital Outcomes: as part of the ‘inclusive growth agenda’, 
generating social value/public capital outcomes from GM controlled or influenced spend rather than 
seeing GM success as being measured simply as economic growth in GVA terms. 
Case Study: Trade union engagement with Mayoral Combined Authorities (West Midlands) 
In a unique arrangement, the West Midlands Combined Authority (WMCA) board has approved a co-
opted observer seat for the Midlands TUC. This governance structure was endorsed by the new metro 
mayor at the Combined Authority’s AGM in June 2017. Initial board meetings have taken place, and 
unions also have seats on each of the Authority’s Commissions. The Midlands TUC will be working 
closely with the WMCA and unions on issues covered by the region’s devolution agreement, including 
the adult education budget. The Regional TUC has also submitted evidence to the Authority’s 
Productivity and Skills Commission. 
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the Tees Valley Metro Mayor and Combined Authority, to develop and implement an industrial 
strategy that can generate increased productivity and prosperity for all individuals and 
communities in Tees Valley.  
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
5.1 Based on our analysis and findings, and drawing upon insights and information from a 
wide range of stakeholders, we propose a series of recommendations to support the 
development and implementation of a Tees Valley Industrial Strategy, and facilitate a distinct 
role for the TUC and its affiliate trade unions within Tees Valley’s new and emergent devolved 
governance institutions. The list is not exhaustive and the TUC should use the recommendations 
as a starting point for constructing and sustaining an effective trade union role in supporting a 
new and emergent Industrial Strategy in Tees Valley, and by extension the UK. We have used the 
analytical framework employed during the course of the project to organise the 
recommendations around strategy, tools and actors.  
 
Strategy 
i. As part of the UK Industrial Strategy, the Government should invite Tees Valley to 
negotiate a ‘New Industrial Deal’ with Government to cement Tees Valley’s position at 
the centre of a just transition to a low carbon economy in the UK and as a means of 
improving the industrial competitiveness of the Tees Valley economy. 
ii. The Tees Valley Industrial Strategy should embrace ‘Inclusive Growth’ as a fundamental 
pillar for building a more productive, equitable and sustainable Tees Valley economy. 
 
Tools 
iii. As part of the development of the UK Industrial Strategy and Tees Valley Industrial 
Strategy, the Government should confirm, by the forthcoming Budget, its formal 
support for the business case prepared by Teesside Collective setting out the rationale for 
Tees Valley to play a leading role in UK CCS technology and industry. 
iv. As part of a move towards a just transition to a low carbon economy, the Government 
should support the H21 project to feed hydrogen into the national gas grid, as part of a 
strategy to develop the hydrogen economy.  
v. The Government should examine if any national regulatory or fiscal measures could 
accelerate the development of the circular economy in Tees Valley, and in particular 
encourage more investment in ‘waste from energy’ jobs and industry.  
47 
 
vi. Local authorities, Tees Valley Mayor and Combined Authority should adopt a campaign 
to encourage public sector bodies to use public procurement and social value to support 
the further development of the circular economy in Tees Valley.  
vii. The Tees Valley Mayor, Combined Authority and local authorities should adopt a broad 
alliance, involving the Northern TUC, to drive forward the national and international 
promotion of Tees Valley as place to invest, live and work. 
viii. Tees Valley Combined Authority should co-ordinate the preparation of innovative 
proposals from the Combined Authority, universities and business to the National 
Productivity Investment Fund and Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund, particularly in 
support of low carbon demonstrator projects. 
ix. Tees Valley Combined Authority should prepare a formal submission to the National 
Infrastructure Commission making the case for the first National Infrastructure 
Assessment to recognise the need for infrastructure investment in Tees Valley to support 
the just transition to a low carbon economy. 
x. The Metro Mayor, Combined Authority and Government should prepare a business case 
seeking Government finance guarantees to de-risk and lower the cost of capital 
investment in Tees Valley’s critical infrastructure. 
xi. The Metro Mayor and Combined Authority should proactively look to secure further 
pension, and potential insurance, sovereign and private placement investment in Tees 
Valley’s infrastructure. 
xii. In the short term, and to help support inward investment, the Government should 
extend Tees Valley’s existing Enterprise Zone incentives out to 2021. 
xiii. The Metro Mayor and Combined Authority should explore the opportunity to develop a 
Tees Valley Wealth Fund to manage physical assets and generate new revenues and 
capital to reinvest in the Tees Valley economy. 
xiv. The Metro Mayor and Combined Authority should work with Government to deliver a 
new programme of investment in Tees Valley’s schools. 
xv. The Government should fully devolve the Adult Education Budget to Tees Valley from 
the start of academic year 2018, with maximum flexibility and sufficient funding to 
enable Tees Valley to build a more productive, inclusive and sustainable economy. 
xvi. The Government and Metro Mayor Combined Authority should develop an integrated 
and locally-led careers support mechanism in Tees Valley covering all age groups. 
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Actors 
xvii. Given the pivotal role of local government in decentralised industrial strategy, and the 
uncertainties presented by Brexit, the Government should reverse its plans to impose 
further spending reductions on Tees Valley local authorities.  
xviii. As a Metro Mayor Combined Authority, Tees Valley should adopt a leading role within 
the English regions in influencing the UK’s position on Brexit negotiations, and in 
particular to push for the UK to have maximum access to the Single Market and 
influence the form and function of the proposed Shared Prosperity Fund.  
xix. In order to strengthen the role of Tees Valley in managing both current ESIF and post-
ESIF mechanisms, Tees Valley should be afforded Intermediate Body status for the Tees 
Valley Sustainable Urban Development Strategy. 
xx. The Mayor and Tees Valley Combined Authority should form a strategic partnership 
with the Northern TUC, and invite the TUC to take up direct representation on the Tees 
Valley Mayoral Combined Authority structures. 
xxi. The Northern TUC should ensure that it focuses all its available capacity on influencing 
the policy areas and resources of the Tees Valley Mayor and Combined Authority that 
relate to the priorities set out in the TUC Campaign Plan.  
xxii. The Tees Valley Mayor and Combined Authority should publicly-support the TUC’s 
campaign for a ‘great jobs agenda’, championing fair and decent pay, regular hours, fair 
treatment and respect, healthy workplaces, and learning and progression. 
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Annex 1: Statistical Analysis of Tees Valley Combined Authority Area 
Theme Tees Valley Combined Authority Tees Valley / 
national 
Tees Valley Liverpool City 
Region 
Context CO2 emissions 2014 /resident 322.2% 20.3 5.4 
Superfast broadband 2016 %  170.2% 87.5% 71.6% 
Mid-Year Population Estimates, 
2016 
Population Growth (2011-15) % 223.2% 0.7 1.2 
Aged 16-64 (%) 98.4% 62.3 63.7 
Age 65+ (%) 103.3% 18.4 18.4 
full-time working residents 2016 £ median weekly pay 92.0% 496 504 
households 2014 average gross domestic household 
income / head (£) 
81.5% 14644.9 15105.4 
Index of Multiple Deprivation, 
2015 
Share of LSOAs in the most deprived 
20% nationally 
184.7% 36.9 44.7 
Share of LSOAs in the least deprived 
20% nationally 
85.1% 17.0 8.7 
% (un)employment Labour Market indicators, 
October 2015-September 2016 
All Employment Rate (aged 16-64) 92.8% 68.4 67.7 
Female Employment Rate  (aged 16-
64) 
93.8% 64.5 65.0 
Male Employment Rate  (aged 16-64) 92.1% 72.5 70.5 
labour market participation Employment rate males – aged 16-19 
2016 
97.6% 32.5 22 
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Theme Tees Valley Combined Authority Tees Valley / 
national 
Tees Valley Liverpool City 
Region 
Employment rate females – aged 16-
19 2016 
89.8% 33.6 33.2 
Employment rate males – aged 20-24 
2016 
92.2% 62.9 58.2 
Employment rate females – aged 20-
24 2016 
77.2% 50.2 67.9 
Employment rate males – aged 25-34 
2016 
95.0% 84.7 85.3 
Employment rate females – aged 25-
34 2016 
92.9% 69 71.1 
labour market participation % of economically inactive who want 
a job 2016 
103.8% 24.8 18.4 
all aged 16-64 March 2016 % on out-of-work Benefits 153.5% 13.2 
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Theme Tees Valley Combined Authority Tees Valley / 
national 
Tees Valley Liverpool City 
Region 
aged 18-21 March 2017 % claimants 229.0% 7.1%   
all employed (except on farms) 
2015 
% working part-time 107.8% 33.3%   
Structure all employed (except on farms) 
2015 
% Mining or Manufacturing 115.3% 9.8% 
 
all aged 16-64 2016 self-employed 71.7% 7.6% 
 
businesses registered 2015 firms per 10,000 residents 67.2% 250 257 
% share of GVA by industry 2015 Manufacturing © 134.1% 13.5 14.1 
Distribution; transport; 
accommodation and food (GHI) 
95.1% 17.9 19.8 
Information and communication; 
Financial and insurance activities; 
Business service activities (J, K, MN) 
67.5% 17.8 19.6 
Public administration; education; 
health (OPQ) 
136.0% 25.4 25.0 
Regional gross value added 
(income approach), 2015 
GVA per hour worked (Index) 89.8% 89.8 90.8 
FDI projects 2016 FDI jobs / 1,000 jobs 50.3% 1.7 
 
Occupations all employed 2016 % SOC1-3 85.1% 38.7 
 
% SOC5 (skilled manual) 108.7% 11.2 
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Theme Tees Valley Combined Authority Tees Valley / 
national 
Tees Valley Liverpool City 
Region 
% SOC6-9 117.9% 31 
 
Qualifications all aged 16-64 2016 NVQ4(+) 80.6% 30.8   
no NVQ1(+) 111.0% 16.2   
labour force qualified with Trade 
Apprenticeships 2016 
% aged 50-64 105.7% 51.5% 40.8% 
Apprenticeship Framework 
Achievement 
2013/15 as % 2011/13 95.4% 96.6% 89.8% 
aged 16 2015 % gaining 5 'GCSEs' 93.2% 53.8% 53.3% 
Migration in/out within-UK NS-SEC in-
migration 2010-11 
1 Higher managerial, administrative 
and professional occupations; 2 
Lower managerial, administrative and 
professional occupations 
89.7% 0.90   
3 Intermediate occupations; 4 Small 
employers and own account workers 
98.3% 0.98   
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Theme Tees Valley Combined Authority Tees Valley / 
national 
Tees Valley Liverpool City 
Region 
5 Lower supervisory and technical 
occupations; 6 Semi-routine 
occupations 
99.6% 1.00   
7 Routine occupations; 8 Never 
worked and long-term unemployed 
111.0% 1.11   
Full-time students 88.0% 0.88   
Brexit all aged 16-64 with Trade 
Apprenticeships 
% that aged 50-64 105.7% 51.5% 40.8% 
non-employed economically 
active people 2016 
% with Trade Apprenticeships 108.2% 2.5%   
NI no. registrations 2015/16 registrations as % employment 38.1% 0.9%   
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